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This paper argues that the choice between free banking and central bank 
NGDP targeting is a difficult to answer empirical question, contrary to the 
position of those on either side of the debate. Public choice concerns, the 
lack of the signals of profit and loss, and optimal determination of currency 
areas are points against any form of central banking. However, free banking 
may be suboptimal relative to central bank NGDP targeting for three 
reasons explored here. Until more data become available, it is impossible to 
gauge the relative importance of one set of these tradeoffs against the other. 
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As the Great Recession continued, some of the most ardent 
supporters of the free market began entertaining the possibility that 
“demand-side” problems were causing persistent unemployment. 
Although the right-wing press has criticized the untraditional 
behavior of central banks, monetary policy actually appeared tight by 
the standard set forth by one of the most eminent and stringent 
inflation hawks of the 20th century, F.A. Hayek. This standard 
requires constant total overall spending in the economy (Hayek, 
1931; White, 1999). This implies that M*V should be kept at a 
constant level for money to remain “neutral.” Following the equation 
of exchange, this is in effect the same as a Nominal Gross Domestic 
Product (NGDP) target of 0%. For the first time in many years, 
NGDP fell in the United States, suggesting that money may have 
been too tight from the standpoint of even Hayek. 
                                                
* The author would like to thank George Selgin, Lars Christensen, Scott Sumner, 
Lee Kelly, Benjamin Powell, Colin O’Reilly, and Nicolas Cachanosky for their 
helpful comments. Any errors are solely his responsibility. 
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A number of economists have pointed out that NGDP was 
allowed to fall during the recession. Modern mainstream 
macroeconomists had taken some version of NGDP targeting 
seriously in the past, albeit with a target greater than 0% (e.g., Hall 
and Mankiw, 1994; see Frankel, 2012 for an informal literature 
review). Many prominent economists and commentators have since 
come out in favor of this policy objective in place of other targets for 
central banks (Woodford, 2012; Romer, 2011; Cowen, 2011; 
Krugman, 2011; Goldman Sachs [Goldstein, 2011]; Barro, 2012; 
Avent, 2011). Meanwhile, many advocates of free markets coalesced 
around this policy objective as a solution to aggregate demand 
deficiencies that did not resort to fiscal policy. This latter position, 
led primarily by economist Scott Sumner, became known as market 
monetarism. 
Meanwhile, modern followers of Hayek had moved in an entirely 
different direction prior to the crisis arising in the first place. 
Concerned with a central bank’s ability to possess the necessary 
information and incentives to perform effective monetary policy, this 
group identified an alternative institutional framework that would not 
succumb to those problems. By deregulating banks and the supply of 
money, competitive pressures would constrain private banks in such 
a way that their note issue would follow a logic consistent with 
consumer demands for money. This institutional arrangement, 
known as “free banking,” would yield an approximation of NGDP 
targeting—a “productivity norm” (Selgin, 1997)—that has many 
similarities to the policy Hayek originally envisioned. 
Early on in the Great Recession, the Cato Institute sponsored a 
symposium intended for the public that allowed Sumner (before the 
phrase “market monetarism” was coined) to present his position that 
money was too tight to an audience that would typically believe the 
opposite (Sumner, 2009). Among those responding to his position 
were free banking advocates taking notice of how similar the two 
schools of thought were. For example, “Scott Sumner's general views 
on macroeconomics are so much in harmony with my own that, in 
commenting on the present essay, I'm hard pressed to steer clear of 
the Scylla of fulsomeness without being drawn into a Charybdis of 
pettifoggery” (Selgin, 2009). This paper can be seen as a continuation 
of this exchange but from a slightly different perspective. Instead of 
determining what monetary policy is optimal to escape the Great 
Recession, I wish to contrast the effectiveness of free banking and 
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central bank NGDP targeting in overcoming obstacles to minimizing 
long-run unemployment. 
There are a number of well-honed objections to central banking 
from the standpoint of the Hayekians, the best three of which I will 
discuss. Objections to free banking, especially for those who take the 
concerns of Hayekians very seriously, are less common; objections to 
free banking typically involve attempting to pull the rug out from 
under it using standard market failure arguments. In place of that, 
this paper seeks to identify issues in optimally targeting NGDP that 
would arise under free banking but not under central banking. The 
disagreement then devolves into a set of empirical questions that are 
difficult to answer satisfactorily. 
Part II will review the standard objections to central bank NGDP 
targeting. Part III will provide what I believe are legitimate concerns 
in the efficacy of the free banking system. Part IV will offer 
interpretation and policy prescription. Part V concludes. 
 
II. Objections to Central Bank NGDP Targeting 
There are three traditional economic objections to central 
banking made by proponents of free banking. One, although 
economists may have an ideal monetary policy, central bankers have 
their own sets of incentives. Two, central banks, because they are a 
top-down mechanism, lack the information a market setting provides. 
Three, central banks have no way of determining the optimal 
currency area, and the size of the currency area in practice is merely 
determined by arbitrary political boundaries. In these ways free 
banking is superior to any policy for central banks. 
 
1. Public Choice 
What economists believe a central bank should do and what 
central banks do in practice are two different things. Famously, 
Arthur F. Burns was notorious for caving in to political pressure 
from Richard Nixon, who pressed for monetary stimulus in time for 
the 1972 election. The field of public choice within economics 
acknowledges that government officials and bureaucrats are human 
beings, and whatever assumptions we make about individuals acting 
on the market and within government should be symmetrical 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 2000, pp. 53–75). If economists assume 
narrowly defined self-interest when it comes to the behavior of 
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financial institutions, they should assume narrowly defined self-
interest when it comes to central bankers. 
Good outcomes in central banking require that the central 
bankers possess a certain public-spiritedness, the correct ideology, or 
a desire to be well-liked among economists. Otherwise, a narrow 
utility maximizer will take advantage of the powers of central banks 
(Wagner, 1986; White, 1988; see especially Boettke and Smith, 2012). 
Advocates of free banking make no such assumption about 
individuals in their banking system. It is driven entirely by the signals 
of profit and loss. In assuming one of the very dangers of central 
banking, free banking advocates are able to show how their system 
will still work. On this margin, free banking is far more robust than 
central banking. 
 
2. The Knowledge Problem 
Central banks lack the knowledge requisite for optimal 
macroeconomic outcomes (Butos, 1986; Selgin, 1988, pp. 89–94; see 
also Hayek, 1978). Assume away all public choice issues mentioned 
above. In that case, one would still be left a bureaucracy hoping it is 
doing more good than harm. The situation is as Mises described the 
behavior of bureaucracy (1944). Even if we have altruistic central 
bankers, they will still possess less knowledge than a system of profit 
and loss would provide. 
This may sound like making a mountain out of a molehill, 
because Western central banks have the most sophisticated modeling 
devices in the world available to them. Here is an example that will 
appeal to most economists’ intuitions. What is the better mechanism 
for determining what the price of an orange should be, a 
sophisticated computer model or supply and demand? Most 
economists would probably say supply and demand.1 Another set of 
prices on the market are interest rates. In manipulating the supply of 
money, the central bank in effect sets the price of all of these interest 
rates. Free banking proposes that we instead allow these prices to be 
determined by supply and demand. 
One counterargument to this is that the central bank can use a 
futures market to determine what the market expects the path of 
NGDP to be (Sumner, 2011a). Under this proposed regime, the 
                                                
1 This can in some ways be seen as analogous to who was right in the socialist 
calculation debate. See Christensen (2012a). 
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government subsidizes into existence an NGDP futures market with 
which it directs monetary policy. This may be an improvement over 
modeling. However, this assumes the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH), and it is unclear whether EMH is still a mainstream position. 
Because it assumes markets are in equilibrium, it is certainly 
antithetical to how most free banking proponents view the way 
economies function (Pasour, 1989). Although prediction markets 
incorporate some dispersed knowledge, they are no substitutes for 
unhindered market institutions developed via the competitive 
process. 
 
3. The Scope of the Currency 
Local economies may be over- or under-shooting their monetary 
equilibrium at any given moment, relative to the economy overall 
(Mundell, 1961; Beckworth, 2010). Unfortunately, a central bank 
charged with adjusting an economy the size of the United States has 
very blunt tools to perform that function. The path of NGDP for the 
whole of the United States may be too low, but in specific regions it 
may be too high. Using a top-down approach, there are significant 
barriers to determining with any accuracy the size of optimal currency 
areas. In free banking, this would be done automatically as individuals 
weigh tradeoffs implicit in their choice of competing banknotes. 
Supply and demand would in turn offer a tendency toward an 
optimal equilibrium for the geographical scope of a currency, as 
opposed to allowing it to be determined by the vagaries of politics. 
Given the tradeoffs now made obvious by the euro, this issue should 
not be dismissed as a concern of secondary importance. 
 
III. Objections to Free Banking 
There are certain problems faced by free banking that are not 
faced by central banks. Central banks have more straightforward 
mechanisms for curtailing the effects of expansionary central banks 
outside their currency area. Central banks would also be able to 
increase the NGDP target should it be the case that the productivity 
norm provides too little inflation to achieve full employment. Certain 
(though perhaps not most) consumers may also choose forms of 
money and banking that do not follow the logic of free banking, and 
this may adversely affect the ability of the free banking system to 
reliably achieve its implicit target. 
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1. Non-Neutral Injections from Foreign Central Banks 
International economics has been briefly discussed2 in the free 
banking literature, but I believe it understates how damaging the 
presence of outside central banks is to an economy with free banking. 
Currency devaluation by foreign central banks may push the free 
banking system off the optimal path for NGDP growth. The 
intention, after all, of currency devaluation is to improve the balance 
of payments by increasing exports and decreasing imports. Some of 
the increase in exports would likely be purchased by individuals in the 
free banking zone, and NGDP will grow faster than optimal. It is 
possible that this will be mediated by exchange rates, but it is unclear 
if it will; it depends on elasticities. 
If devaluation by foreign central banks has no effect on trade 
balances and it is perfectly mediated via the exchange rates, this 
means that the “Marshall-Lerner condition” does not hold (see 
Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009, pp. 457–59). As long as the price 
elasticities of exports and imports are greater than one, it will 
improve the trade balance of the country which devalues. Modern 
literature has established firmer microfoundations for why this is 
true, such as local costs driving a wedge between prices and imported 
costs (Burstein et al., 2003), oligopolistic markets (Atkeson and 
Burstein, 2008), and price rigidity (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 
2003). 
 Let MF and VF represent the money issued by banks inside 
the free banking system. Let MZ and VZ represent the money issued 
by foreign central banks that effectively contributes to NGDP within 
the currency area (whether directly by individuals or indirectly 
through financial markets). Finally, let PF/Z represent the exchange 
rate between the two types of currencies. Then, 
 
NGDP = MFVF + MZVZPF/Z. 
 
If MZ increases as a result of currency devaluation, MF would 
need not fall in lockstep to counteract the injection in currency, as 
there is no profit incentive for the unregulated banks to behave that 
way. Furthermore, financial markets may not adjust such that PF/Z 
                                                
2 See Cachanosky (2012) for an exhaustive review of this small literature. The 
closest discussion of the problem I am describing here can be found in Hoffman 
(2010).  
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falls so as to guarantee that NGDP returns to its optimal growth rate; 
again, that depends on elasticities. This means that the productivity 
norm will not be maintained unless the elasticities are just right. 
Once NGDP is pushed off the optimal path, the pernicious 
effects of an oversupply of money may occur, whether that means 
monetary disequilibrium, the Keynesian “overheating” story, or 
Austrian business cycle (Horwitz, 2000). However, this would not 
have happened under a central bank targeting NGDP. It would 
observe the increase in NGDP and contract the money supply to 
counteract it. These concerns are not idle musings, either; foreign 
lending causing excessive expansion has a classic example in 
Thailand’s 1997 crisis. The central bank was behaving reasonably well 
by central banking standards (though not targeting NGDP), but 
loanable funds were flooding in from other nations anxious to lend. 
If Thailand’s central bank had been targeting NGDP, there is no 
reason why this would have happened (Christensen, 2012b). 
 
2. Pathological Wage Stickiness 
Modern economists believe that a little bit of inflation is good, 
and not because it is desirable to continually try subverting 
expectations. They believe there are structural and pathological issues 
that are simplified when the value of currency is continuously 
declining. “We know wages are extremely sticky, we just don’t know 
why,” writes Sumner (2011b). If this is true—and it is a widely held 
view among economists—then the case for the pure productivity 
norm is weakened.3 Even if, on average, wages stay the same, 
employers will struggle to reduce the wages of those whose 
productivity deserves a wage cut. Although Selgin (1997) has 
addressed many of these issues, and he has dismissed the idea that 
inflation is necessary for full employment as “dubious” (1988, p. 
150), alternative expositions of this argument maintain academic 
respectability. The more modern perspective, articulated for instance 
by Christiano et al. (2005), Akerlof et al. (1996), Card and Hyslop 
(1997), and Kahn (1997), is more resistant to Selgin’s responses. 
As Selgin argues, if 0% inflation is sufficient to avert 
unemployment caused by wage stickiness, then 1% deflation will not 
cause unemployment when it coincides with a 1% increase in 
                                                
3 This version of wage stickiness argues that the view that observed wage stickiness 
is not merely the result of current institutional arrangements. 
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productivity. Overall consumer prices will fall and wages will stay 
constant. But this is not the issue that modern wage stickiness is 
about. If agents are identical and there is no need to shift workers 
between industries, a productivity norm will work. But once we need 
to reallocate workers between different industries, wages in certain 
industries would need to rise while others fall. Their proposed 
solution is to continually pump inflation into the economy (although 
obviously not at an increasing rate) so that workers may be reallocated 
between industries using price signals without requiring certain 
individuals’ wages to fall. 
There are two interpretations to this issue, if modern wage 
stickiness is correct. Perhaps economies may not “overheat” until a 
certain rate of inflation associated with full employment is reached, 
even in the long run. Alternatively, the economy may achieve 
sustainable growth only at very low levels of inflation (or, per Selgin, 
deflation), but the money illusion still causes unemployment at these 
low levels of inflation.  
In the latter interpretation, effectively there is a tradeoff between 
unemployment caused by the business cycle and unemployment 
caused by the money illusion. If one targets inflation to eliminate the 
money illusion, unemployment in years 1 to 4 may be 5%, 5%, 5%, 
and 10%. If one suppresses inflation as extensively as Selgin 
recommends, unemployment in years 1 to 4 may be 7%, 7%, 7%, and 
7%. It is not clear which of these two states of the world is better. 
Furthermore, by jiggering those values around in a way that maintains 
the intuition and stays in the realm of reasonability, we can find a 
situation in which it is clearly better to have low unemployment 
normally, with the occasional business cycle, than it is to eliminate 
the business cycle.4 With a central bank, we can reach a possibly 
desirable higher NGDP target than we would under free banking if 
modern wage stickiness is in fact right. It is unclear what mechanism 
would allow us to reach it under free banking. 
 
3. Market Demand for Confounding Forms of Money and Banking 
Selgin (1988) and Selgin and White (1994) have argued, using 
both theory and historical case studies, that the unregulated market 
                                                
4 Of course, there is resource destruction with a business cycle, which is another 
cost, but it can hardly be assumed that this a priori makes the state of the world 
with inflation worse. 
 R.H. Murphy / The Journal of Private Enterprise 29(1), 2013, 25–39 33 
would employ the type of free banking system they specify in their 
work. Free banking scholars have used a conjectural history of 
banking systems in the absence of government regulation, employing 
accounts of many nearly unregulated banking systems as a guide. 
They fault the work of other scholars investigating unregulated 
banking systems for being flatly ahistorical: 
 
The value of [studies of unregulated payment systems] is 
limited, however, by their authors’ use of ad hoc assumptions, 
ranging from the proliferation of competing fiat currencies at 
one extreme to the complete absence of money at the other. 
To be really useful in interpreting the effects of regulation in 
the past, or in predicting the consequences of deregulation in 
the future, a theory of unregulated banking should be based 
on realistic assumptions drawn, if possible, from actual 
experience. (Selgin, 1988, p. 16, emphasis in original) 
 
The historical tendency toward the use of the system they specify is 
not what is disputed. Instead, a portion of the supply of money may 
be fulfilled via institutions outside the free banking system. Although 
free banking theorists have demonstrated that unregulated currency 
areas have tended toward free banking, they have not demonstrated 
that 100% of money will be supplied using these means. Perhaps 
0.01%, 10%, or 50% of money will be supplied using alternatives; we 
just do not know.  
Financial instruments are regularly invented in modern 
economies, many of which often behave “like” money. And we 
should not forget that economists are unable to draw bright lines as 
to what even constitutes money. Even if we believe that notes that 
fall under the aegis of a free banking regime will completely dominate 
typical transactions (thereby entirely granting the free banking 
historical argument), other forms of payment may play significant 
roles (as they do today) in financial transactions. These free market 
alternatives (again, some of which are used today) to free banking 
include: 
 
1. Money-less payment systems, i.e., the original intention of Paypal. 
Such systems may develop their own institutional rules governing 
their currencies, but if they do not use base “outside” money, 
they will not have the profit motive to target NGDP. 
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2. The BFH system (Greenfield and Yeager, 1983), which targets 
the value of a pool of goods and services. 
3. Bitcoins, an online currency of which there will eventually be a 
static total of 21 million units (Lowenthal, 2011). These could be 
potentially used as base money in the free banking system, but 
they could also follow another rule, such as inflation targeting. 
4. More “traditional” currencies that consciously target inflation 
(Klein, 1974; Hayek, 1976). 
5. Local currencies intending to keep production localized (Swann 
and Witt, 1997; Pacione, 1997). The most prominent of these 
currencies, the Berkshares, presently pegs exchange rates, but 
there is talk of pegging it to the value of local commodities 
(O’Brien, 2011). 
6. 100% reserve commodity banking, under which the money 
supply grows only if more of the commodity is produced. 
 
These systems of payment may not be a significant portion of the 
market, but they could be. And regardless of how small a part of the 
market they take up, their presence inhibits the ability of the free 
banking system to attain a productivity norm in equilibrium. For 
instance, if 25% of the market uses inflation-targeting currencies, the 
economy overall will overshoot the productivity norm. Free 
banking’s clearinghouse mechanism has no discernible reason to 
incentivize banks to contract their quantity of inside money in 
response to the overshooting. 
An NGDP-targeting central bank would be able to solve this by 
forcing more money or pulling it out to counteract the effects of 
these parallel regimes. There is no theoretical reason why firms 
operating under a free banking regime would have the profit motive 
to do so. Whether this an important or an insignificant issue in 
practice, the NGDP-targeting central bank would eliminate it, 
whereas under free banking deviations from the productivity norm 
may persist indefinitely. 
 
IV. Implications and Policy Prescription 
The magnitudes of each of these concerns are empirical 
questions. However, because the problems with NGDP targeting are 
also present under status quo monetary policy, both market 
monetarists and free bankers should prefer NGDP targeting over 
status quo. Still, it is difficult to imagine fixing the fundamental 
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problems with central banking. No amount of rule setting offers the 
same discipline the market does. Public choice problems will always 
remain no matter how angelic we hope bureaucrats will one day 
become. In contrast, the potential problems with free banking are 
“mere” questions of magnitude in the sense that we just do not have 
a very good idea about how important they would really be under 
free banking in modern economies. We also are in no position to 
know that entrepreneurs will be unable to “get around” these issues. 
As such, it is reasonable to consider free banking as an ideal, if 
utopian goal. For now, however, NGDP targeting is an important 
step in getting there, if only as part of a grander “privatization 
strategy” (Christensen, 2011) (see Table 1). 
Because we lack many modern examples of free banking, it is 
difficult to determine the relative magnitudes of these problems 
under each of the institutional arrangements. Although all economists 
may have their priors regarding the importance of each problem, 
what is most needed is more experimentation and data—in Hayek’s 
words, “tinkering.” If NGDP targeting is implemented, different 
Western nations should experiment with different targets. Some 
nations should experiment with a very low target, including zero. At 
that point, we will begin having stronger evidence of whether or not 
wage stickiness is the type of problem some economists insist it is. 
A small country such as Singapore or Hong Kong may be the 
best starting point for performing a full experiment with free 
banking. It may be necessary, however, for the government to first 
institute rather draconian capital controls to ensure that excessive 
foreign  loanable  funds  do not  enter the  country.  If and  when the 
 
Table 1: Summary of Tradeoffs  





Incentives – + 
Knowledge problems – + 
Optimized currency area – + 
Non-neutral injections from 
foreign central banks 
+ – 
Pathological wage stickiness + – 
Market demand for other 
institutional arrangements 
+ – 
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supremacy of free banking is demonstrated on all margins except 
international trade, one could then remove the capital controls and 
see if issues then arise. 
 
V. Conclusion 
There are good arguments questioning both central bank NGDP 
targeting and free banking. Incentives and information (in both the 
Hayekian sense and in determining the optimal currency area) are 
excellent reasons why we should relegate the supply of currency to a 
system governed by profit and loss. But there are at least three 
confounding issues that seem to be better solved through central 
banks. Of course, the strengths of entrepreneurship and the market 
in general are that they discover solutions where the blackboard may 
tell us not to expect solutions. That is why it is desirable to see the 
elimination of the central bank as an ideal to tinker toward, but at the 
same time it is extremely undesirable to lose sight of the clear 
superiority of NGDP targeting to the present system. Furthermore, 
free banking advocates must take these issues seriously, and until 
scholarship shows otherwise, the efficacy of free banking versus an 
NGDP targeting central bank is an empirical question, and an 
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